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ABSTRACT:. Interregional wage differences in the Spanish economy are of considerable magnitude. 
More precisely the average wage in Madrid is 69% higher than in Murcia and the figure for Cataluña is 
47% higher. The main objective of this paper is to explain these differences. In order to do so, we 
estimate enlarged Mincer equations and study the quantitative importance of the "territorial effect" on 
wages. Then we attempt to explain these effects as compensatory differences or as a result of existent 
disequilibrium in the provincial labour markets.  
 
The evidence obtained allows us to determine the magnitude of the "territorial effect." Once the 
influence of the individual and job characteristics are controlled for, there still remain positive 
differences slightly greater than 24% between the provinces of Barcelona and Sevilla and about 13% 
between Madrid and Sevilla. These wage differences are compensating to some extent for differences 
in the levels of prices, but they do not correspond to the unequal attraction of the Spanish provinces. 
The differences are explained, finally, by the unequal level of prices and by the irregular distribution 
of unemployment between provinces, which is shown to have a negative effect on wages close to the 
magnitude estimated by Blanchflower/Oswald (1994). 
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1. Introduction 
 
As in the majority of western countries, geographical wage differences can also be found in 
the Spanish economy. The little empirical evidence available emphasises the importance of 
two facts: first, that these differences can only be explained partially by differences in the 
regional industrial structure and, second, that observed differences do not balance varying 
non-monetary working conditions. The objective of this study is to investigate the explanatory 
causes of wage differences between Spanish provinces, attempting to discover whether they 
correspond to compensatory variations for the unequal attraction in physical, cultural and 
economical terms of the different areas or if they can be interpreted as a disequilibrium 
phenomenon, mainly as a result of the limited geographical mobility of the Spanish 
population. 
 
In this paper we use data from the Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares (survey about family 
budgets) 1990/ 91 carried out by the National Institute of Statistics (INE) of Spain. This 
survey contains information about personal and job characteristics. Using these data, we 
estimate enlarged Mincer equations with the purpose, in the first place, of studying the 
quantitative importance of the "territorial effect" on wages and, in the second, of contrasting 
both explanatory hypotheses: compensatory differences versus disequilibrium in provincial 
labour markets. The evidence obtained permits to quantify the magnitude of the "territorial 
effect". So, for example, once personal characteristics (sex, educational level, work 
experience) and the features of the job (occupation, sector of activity, part-time) are controlled 
for, there persist positive differences slightly greater than 24% between Barcelona and Sevilla 
and of about 13% between Madrid and Sevilla, as well as negative differences of almost 18% 
between Almería and Sevilla. Also, the paper permits the conclusion that geographical 
differences in nominal wages compensate, to some extent, differences in price levels, although 
nominal wages neither respond to the unequal climatic attraction, nor to the unequal provision 
of cultural, educational, health and leisure services in the Spanish provinces. Interprovincial 
wage differences are explained, more than by uneven price levels, by the irregular distribution 
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of unemployment across the Spanish geographical area, and this should be related to the low 
degree of geographical mobility of labour. 
 
This paper is structured as follows. In the second section, a brief review is made of the 
literature on geographical wage differences. In the third section, the geographical structure of 
wages in Spain is described using some recent statistical sources and a summary of the 
available work for the Spanish case is presented. In the fourth section the methodology and the 
data used are explained, as well as the estimates obtained. The paper concludes with some 
comparative conclusions from the results obtained and some future lines of improvement. 
 
 
2. Geographical wage differences: theoretical considerations and empirical evidence 
 
From a simple neoclassical perspective, perfect competition in markets, perfect mobility of the 
labour force and complete information guarantee that market forces equalize wages in 
different regions or that, in the event that certain differences exist between jobs or regions, 
they make the net advantage of working in different labour markets equal. As a result, we 
would expect that observed wages are equal, unless there exist differences that make some 
regions or jobs more attractive than others. These differences can be of various types. In the 
first place, heterogeneity among workers in relative terms is due, mainly, to their varying 
productivity, an aspect that could be summarised by their human capital (Mincer, 1974). The 
same is true of jobs: in less satisfactory jobs or in jobs that imply greater risks, workers earn 
higher wages in compensation, a fact that should be kept in mind as a possible explanation of 
wage behaviour. A third factor in which regions could differ is their attraction with respect to 
geographical and climatic conditions, cultural, leisure or public services. The interregional 
equilibrium will be obtained when the utility derived from residing in different zones is equal 
(Rosen, 1974). Essential features that differentiate regions are their price levels, so that 
observed differences could reflect a situation of equilibrium upon correcting to balance the 
varying costs of goods and services, including housing. 
 3
 
To break with the basic assumptions previously mentioned offers variations of considerable 
interest. If labour markets are not perfectly competitive, we could find different 
unemployment rates in the regions being considered. In this case, the neoclassical theory, still 
along the lines of compensatory differences, points out that wages will reach higher levels in 
the areas of higher unemployment, thereby balancing the risk of becoming unemployed, or in 
a similar way, equalling the flow of income from labour in the different regions 
(Harris/Todaro, 1970). Nevertheless, modern theories of the determination of wages postulate 
a negative relationship between wages and unemployment, including at the regional level 
(efficiency wages: Stiglitz, 1986; Weiss, 1990; insiders-outsiders: Lindbeck/Snower, 1988). 
These approaches do not necessarily invalidate the model of Harris/Todaro, but they allow to 
work with the hypothesis that, in the short term- while the migratory flows do not equalize the 
net advantage in regions-, the observable relationship between wages and unemployment is 
negative. 
 
Moreover, other restrictions can transform a transitory situation of disequilibrium into a 
permanent one. According to the neoclassical mechanism, a local recessive shock would 
decrease wages making the region less advantageous for workers in that market. This fact 
would generate an emigratory flow towards other markets with a better combination of real 
wages and attractions, until the new equilibrium point was reached. The existence of 
restrictions on wage adjustments or on the mobility of the labour force would decelerate the 
process towards equilibrium and the disequilibrium situation would tend to continue or, at 
least, to last larger than optimally or necessary. Some institutional mechanisms in the fixing of 
wages, such as national agreements, or the presence over the entire territory of the public 
sector or such as multiplant companies of interregional scope, isolate wages from the 
conditions of the local labour markets. In a similar way, obstacles to migration decelerate the 
process of adjustment. In whichever of either situations, territorial wage differences will tend 
to persist at higher levels than the strictly compensatory. 
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The empirical evidence on these approaches is considerably broad, especially  in the United 
States, where a debate has been produced lasting almost three decades about the existence of a 
wage differential between the industrialized north and the less developed south. One group of 
studies attributes it to the price differential between each zone (Coelho/Ghali, 1971; Bellante, 
1979; Gerking/Weirick, 1983; Dickie/Gerking, 1987), while other authors find that, once the 
variables related to the human capital of the workers are controlled for, the differential in 
terms of real wages turns out to be favourable to the south (Sahling/Smith, 1983; 
Farber/Newman, 1987). Finally, some other work conclude that, including control variables 
for human capital, for the industrial composition of employment and keeping in mind the 
differences in the cost of living, there are still significant wage differences attributable to the 
"territorial effect," an effect that in general is favourable to the metropolitan areas of the south 
and south-east of the United States (Hanushek, 1981; Johnson, 1983; Montgomery, 1992). 
 
The studies that analyze the British case using individual data also find that, once the variables 
related to human capital and other personal characteristics are controlled for, the presence of 
"territorial effects" on wages is significant (Hughes/McCormik, 1987). But the most 
outstanding feature of the British literature is the inclusion of variables of demand -usually the 
regional unemployment- in the explanation of interregional wage differences. The detected 
effect is statistically significant and of a negative value, indicating that the level of a wages in 
a territory is inversely related to its unemployment rate (Blackaby/Manning, 1990). In this 
context, Blanchflower (1991) and especially Blanchflower/Oswald (1994), working with 
several samples from different countries and years, have found as an empirical regularity a 
coefficient of approximately -0.1 of the regional unemployment rate on the wage level in the 
same area. 
 
In conclusion, the main ideas that can be deduced from the theoretical and empirical literature 
for applied studies can be summarised in four points. Firstly, it is absolutely necessary to work 
with individual data sets containing information about the characteristics of the wage earner 
and on his/her job. Secondly, it is also necessary to have information about price levels at a 
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regional level. Thirdly, it is necessary to incorporate as explanative variables information 
about the unequal attraction of the areas. And fourthly, the existence of unemployment 
suggests -particularly in the Spanish case - contrasting the sign of the coefficient of the 
unemployment rate in order to test alternative explanations: compensatory differences as 
opposed to institutional rigidities. 
 
 
3. The territorial structure of wages in Spain 
 
The National Institute of Statistics (INE) has recently published the results of the Encuesta de 
Estructura Salarial (survey on wage structure) 1995, carried out in 1996. According to this 
survey, that offers information for Autonomous Communities (NUTS II), the region with the 
highest average wage is Madrid (22.8% above the Spanish average), followed by the País 
Vasco (14.3% above) and by Cataluña (6.5%). The regions of lower wage levels are Murcia 
(27.5% below the average), Castilla-La Mancha (23.0%) and the Canarias Islands (20.5%). 
This means that the differences between regions are very considerable: The average wage in 
the Community of Madrid is 69.5% higher than in Murcia, the País Vasco 57.7% higher than 
in Murcia and Cataluña 46.9% higher than in Murcia. 
 
The Encuesta de Salarios en la Industria y los Servicios (survey on wages in manufacturing 
and services) is a quarterly survey carried out by the INE on firms of five or more workers of 
the same industries as the source mentioned above. This survey provides different results to 
the previous one, but they both draw a wage map that is quite similar. In 1996 the 
Autonomous Communities where the observed wages were above the Spanish average 
consisted of the País Vasco (28.5%), Madrid (13.8%), Asturias (9.1%), Navarra (7.1%), 
Aragón (3.6%), Cantabria (3.3%) and Cataluña (2.2%), while the rest of the Spanish regions 
are below the average. 
 
MAP 1 
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The Autonomous Communities with higher wage levels are situated geographically in the 
northeast quadrant of the peninsula, except Madrid which is in the centre, and they represent 
24% of the Spanish territory (see Map 1). At the beginning of the 20th century, these regions 
were the most industrialised in Spain and had the highest levels of income. They continued 
their industrialisation process with great dynamism, especially in the fifties and sixties, 
producing more than 52% of the Spanish GDP from 1973 onwards. Some of these regions -
specifically Asturias and the País Vasco- suffered from the crisis of the seventies and the 
decline of their basic industries, mainly mining and the iron and steel industry, with special 
acuteness as they lost their positions in the income per capita ranking to regions characterized 
by an industrial composition based on small sized but highly efficient firms (Community of 
Valencia) or a competitive service industry (Baleares Islands).  
 
The empirical literature on wage differences in Spain, although not very abundant, provides 
some interesting results that deserve to be remarked upon. Applying the methodology 
proposed by Wonnacott/Wonnacott (1967), Rodríguez (1988) finds that differences among 
nominal wages could not be explained more than partially by the industrial composition of the 
productive activity
1
. A similar result was obtained by Lorente (1992)
2
. These studies show that 
there are significant wage differences within the same industry depending on its geographical 
location. Therefore, the estimations done by Rodríguez (1988) of different wage equations at a 
provincial level for 1975 and 1981 reveal the importance of labour demand when only 
                                                     
1
 " It is possible to affirm that in Spain provinces of lower wages for similar kinds of jobs do not seem to be very 
specialized in low wage industries." (Rodríguez 1988:15). 
2
 We would like to point to our disagreement with this author. The application of the national average industrial 
composition in terms of labour to every region generates very limited changes. Andalucía, 21% below the 
Madrid average wage, increases its average wage only by 2 points due to the industrial homogenization; 
Aragón and Castilla-Leon decrease by 2 points on 15% and 17%; Cantabria 1 point on 27%; Cataluña 1 point 
over 12%; Galicia, Navarra and the País Vasco are not affected. Castilla-La Mancha, Valencia and Rioja 
increase 3 points on 32%, 26% and 28% respectively and Murcia reduces its difference of 32% to 28%. In fact 
only two high-specialisation regions have quantitatively important effects: the Canary Island, which increases 5 
points -being 22% below Madrid-, and Asturias, which decreases 7 points. Faced with this evidence, Lorente 
(1992:17) affirms that "this fact demonstrates that wages geographical dispersion is due mainly to sectorial and 
occupational dispersion", a conclusion, at least, debateable. 
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considering a 3 digit-industry classification and the positive effect on wages of residing in the 
northern regions of Spain. García Ferrer (1979) also estimates provincial wage equations for 
1960 and 1970, where wages depend on the provincial structure of population by age, levels of 
education, occupations and urban or rural location. According to his conclusions, most wage 
differences can be explained by educational variables and by different kinds of occupations, 
while territorial dummy variables have a positive effect on provincial wages in locations in the 
North and East. 
 
Bentolila/Dolado (1991) estimate regional wage equations where the endogenous variable is 
the growth of the average real wage of a region relative to the national average real wage. 
Their results show the importance of the Autonomous Community dummy variables, in 
Madrid, Asturias, Cantabria and the País Vasco above the average growth and, below the 
average, Andalucía, Castilla-La Mancha, Extremadura and Murcia. Also, they find a positive 
effect, although very small, of the regional unemployment rate (defined as the difference with 
respect to the national rate) on regional wages, which shows the compensating role of 
unemployment. 
 
On the other hand, Lorences/Fernández/Rodríguez (1995) studied 300 provincial wage fixing 
collective agreements for 1978, 1985 and 1991. Their results indicate the existence of 
significant interprovincial wage differences, consolidated in the course of the time. They also 
point out that non-monetary labour conditions (like security regulations and labour hygiene, 
restrictions to dismissal or social subsidies, among others) do not compensate for the 
differences in the negotiated wages, but tend more to be directly related to the wage level. This 
latter prediction runs against the theory of compensatory differences. 
 
Finally, Albert/Malo (1995) use individual data from 1,892 workers from a sample of the 
Encuesta de Estructura, Conciencia y Biografía de Clase (survey on structure, conscience and 
class biography) carried out in 1991. Although their objective is to evaluate the effect of risk 
at work on wages, they estimate equations for individual wages including, among others, 
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dummy variables corresponding to the Autonomous Community where workers reside. Once 
the effects of other variables are controlled for, wage differences among a certain number of 
Spanish regions remain significant. Specifically, Extremadura, Galicia, Castilla-León, 
Andalucia and Castilla-La Mancha make up a geographical area of low "residual wages" while 
Madrid, the País Vasco, Cataluña and Valencia show a positive "territorial effect" on wages. 
 
To summarize, the previous studies on the topic carried out in Spain are not conclusive, 
indicating the need to study territorial wage differences with a rigorous methodology similar 
to that used in other western countries. Nevertheless, these studies point towards the 
importance of a group of variables regarding territory, such as the industrial composition of 
employment and the unemployment rate, as well as the need to keep in mind a wide group of 
personal and job characteristics in order to control for their possible effect on wages. This is 
the challenge of this paper as well as its main objective. 
 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
 
 4.1. Statistical sources and definition of variables  
 
The estimations presented in this paper are based on individual data from a sample of the 
Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares carried out by the INE with reference to the years 1990-
1991. The basic purpose of this survey was the study of the expenditure made on goods and 
services by Spanish families. Nevertheless, the span of the statistical operation was used to 
collect information about Spanish families. In this additional information we found 
information about the characteristics and equipment of houses, information about personal and 
job characteristics and wages, etc.. The availability of this broad individualised information, 
and the fact that it has not yet been used for a similar study suggested its use in this paper. We 
have worked with data on 16,949 individuals who declared positive incomes from paid 
employment in non-agricultural industries. 
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The information about the level of prices in 1990 in the various regions was taken from 
Lorente (1992). In fulfilment of an agreement with EUROSTAT, the INE carried out the 
Encuesta Regional de Precios (survey on regional prices) for 1989. In the work mentioned, 
Lorente projected prices for 1988-1991 by applying the regional growth rates of prices for 
every year to the 1989 levels. The limitations of this statistical source for the analysis under 
consideration are important. Data on levels of prices are considered at NUTS-II level, while 
the wage study is carried out on a provincial scale (NUTS-III), which has obliged us to assign 
the same level of prices to every province of the same Autonomous Community. With the 
exception of the seven uniprovincial Autonomous Communities
3
, this fact implies a 
generalisation that limits the explanatory capacity of the price variable. Moreover, the fact that 
the INE only attributes the data obtained in the most important city of the region, usually the 
political capital, to all the Autonomous Community, introduces an unequal bias
4
. In spite of 
these limitations, we have used this indicator of prices as it is the only indicator available on a 
territorial scale. 
 
Data related to the attraction of the territories have been taken from the Anuario Estadístico de 
España (Spain statistical yearbook) published by the INE. The coast kilometres variable has 
been defined for provinces as the sea peninsular boundaries -excluding the perimeter of small 
islands- and the sea island boundaries in the case of the Baleares and Canarias Islands. The 
temperature variable has been calculated as the difference between the absolute maximum and 
the absolute minimum, both in monthly averages over the period 1931-1980 and is intended to 
express the inconvenience of residing in zones with extreme temperatures of both above and 
                                                     
3
 Asturias, Baleares Islands, Cantabria, La Rioja, Madrid, Murcia and Navarra. 
4
 It is important because, for example, the observed prices in Sevilla are attributed by the INE to the Autonomous 
Community of Andalusia and unequal because the specific weight of the sample city in the whole region is 
different for every region. For example, while the city of Madrid represents 60.8% of the population in the 
Autonomous Community of Madrid, Albacete only represents 7.8% of Castilla-La Mancha. 
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below zero
5
. The variable on educational services has been defined as the number of 
university faculties in 1990 in each province, excluding the university centres in the same 
province where the same degrees can be studied and which belong to the same university. The 
health services of a territory have been proxied by the operative number of beds in health 
centres in relation to the population of each province. Concerning the provision of cultural 
services, the number of libraries in relation to the population has been used. The possibilities 
of leisure and entertainment has been approached through the number of new films projected 
in 1990
6
 and by the number of restaurants, these being the only available information, 
expressing both variables in terms of the number of inhabitants. Finally, data about the 
unemployment rate in the fourth quarter of 1990 has been taken from Encuesta de Población 
Activa (active population survey) which was carried out by the INE. 
 
 4.2. Methodology and calculation of results 
 
We have estimated enlarged Mincer equations that also incorporate a certain number of 
variables related to the above mentioned factors. A semi-logarithmic function was used, this 
being the most adequate functional form for this type of estimation with individual data 
(Mincer, 1974). The logarithm of the annual wage depends on a vector of individual and 
regional characteristics that proxy the workers qualification levels, the job characteristics, the 
possibilities of discrimination at work or on the grounds of sex and the presence of "territorial 
effects". In a second stage, the 49 provincial dummy variables are substituted by territorial 
attraction and other variables, to finally include the logarithm of the unemployment rate in 
order to express the influence of the demand for labour on wages. 
 
The estimates have been carried out by ordinary least squares (OLS) and the results were 
found to be satisfactory. The various models explain around 40% of the variation of wages, a 
                                                     
5
 For example, Teruel, with a difference of 70 centigrade degrees between a maximum temperature of 40 degrees 
and a minimum of 30 below zero. 
6
 We have, alternatively, included the number of cinemas, obtaining very similar results. 
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similar percentage to that of other studies on the topic which use individual data. It is also 
important to remark that we are using data of annual salaries. The survey used does not 
provide information about hourly or weekly wages and the variable on part-time jobs only 
provides information about people who work less than a third of the usual working hours. 
 
Heteroscedasticity can be found in these kinds of models as a consequence of differences 
between variations in wages received by different groups of workers. A previous analysis of 
data using contrasts of variance equality between sub-samples has shown that the most 
important source of heteroscedasticity is related to the variable of experience. However, upon 
considering the existence of a non-linear relationship between wages and experience 
(following the current literature), the value of the statistic of White's Test (1959.31) does not 
permit rejection of the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity at a signification level of 0.05
7
 and 
for this reason, validates the use of OLS. 
 
As shown in Table 1, the educational level and the years of potential experience
8
 are 
significant and show the expected signs. Concerning the individual of reference -who has 
obtained the EGB qualification (basic educational level)-, workers with primary education, or 
without education or illiterate, if the remaining factors are equal, get significantly lower 
wages, especially illiterates (31.4% or less). On the other hand, workers with educational 
levels above EGB receive higher wages: Professional Training (FP) of the first grade allows 
an individual to receive a wage 22.1% higher than those at EGB level;  the Bachillerato (BUP) 
(upper secondary education), 33.6% more than EGB, while a university student with short 
studies receives a wage higher by about 89.8%. Obtaining a long course university degree 
allows an individual to earn more than twice the salary of workers with the EGB (114.9%). In 
                                                     
7
 The auxiliary regression of White’s Test contains a constant, the 87 exogenous variables in the model, the 1763 
non-zero cross-products regressors and the square of the squared-experience (as squares of the dummy 
variables are identical to the original dummy, they are not included as additional regressors), so the distribution 
of the statistic can be approximated by a normal distribution with average 1851 and standard deviation 60.84 
giving a critical value at 0.05 signification level of 1970.26. 
8
 Defined, in the usual way, as age minus years of schooling minus six. 
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terms of wages, it is important to point out that the Spanish labour market seems to value more 
the BUP (secondary education) than the first level FP (professional training), and similarly 
COU (university entrance course) than the second level FP. This result helps to explain the 
great demand for university education and the high scholarization rate up to the age of 24 
years. 
 
TABLE 1 
 
The accumulation of professional experience also has a positive effect on wages, although the 
concavity of the relationship- revealed by the negative value of the coefficient of the variable 
square of the experience- indicates decreasing returns for investment in specific human capital 
and even the existence of a starting age from which additional experience has a negative 
influence on wages. According to the model, this limit is situated at 39.6 years of experience. 
This implies that, for example, a person with BUP studies should expect his/her wage begins 
when he/she reaches 57 years of age. 
 
People working part-time, defined as a third of the usual working hours, only receive a wage 
of about 60% less than those working full-time. The results also indicate that the wages of 
women are substantially lower than those of men. This can be attributed to female labour 
discrimination. However, the variable experience is probably inadequately reflecting the true 
work experience of females, as periods of inactivity or unemployment are more frequent 
among women
9
. 
 
The dummy variables related to the occupations express the effect of job characteristics for 
example, fatigue or risk, but also the associated attraction and advantages, as well as the 
additional required qualification. We have taken low qualified work in the service sectors 
                                                     
9
 Moreover, it is possible that the coefficient value will be collecting the contribution of women in part-time work 
between one third of full-time and full-time that is not captured by this specific variable, which is supposed to 
be more significant for women than for men. 
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(such as waiters, cleaning staff, hairdressing or security guards) as the base category. The 
estimation results show that, when the other factors are controlled for, only labourers earn less 
than the base occupation (-7.4%) while the remaining occupations receive higher wages, 
although these are not significantly different in the cases of the artistic occupations
10
 and 
construction workers. The biggest difference with respect to the base occupation concerns 
sales executives (67.9% above) and office, transport and communications services managers 
(44.1% above), followed by shop managers, foremen and persons in charge (40.4%), 
professionals and higher technicians (38.4%) and managers of companies, commercial 
establishments and in hotels and catering (37.9%). 
 
The information related to sectors of activity permits, on the one hand, to control for the effect 
of the various productive and employment structures in the various provinces and, on the 
other, more information to be offered about job characteristics not previously considered
11
. 
Unfortunately, the low level of segregation of sectors of activity limits the efficiency of this 
variable in covering the defined objectives. We have taken as the base category the sector of 
commerce, restaurants, hotels and catering and repairs (sector 6). The results indicate that 
together with other manufacturing industries, it is the sector with lowest wages if the rest of 
factors are equal. The industry with the highest wage differential is energy and water (25.4% 
more than the base industry), followed by the chemical industry and the extraction and 
elaboration of minerals (20.3% higher) and the transport and communications sector (14.3%). 
It seems clear that when the rest of factors are equal, activities characterized by firms of 
greater size offer better opportunities in terms of wages. 
 
TABLE 2 
                                                     
10
 This category includes writers, journalists, sculptors, decorators, photographers, musicians, sportsmen and 
others not classified. The result -wages not different to low qualified workers- can be explained by the fact that 
in this kind of occupation wages are complemented by incomes proceeding from freelance work which are not 
classified as wages. 
11
 It should be obvious, for example, that the occupation ‘accounting technician’ can be defined variously as 
being in finance, in commerce or in other manufacturing industries. 
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Finally, the provincial dummy factors show the existence of a quantitatively significant 
"territorial effect". One can observe, for example, that the effect on wages of residing in 
Barcelona instead of Sevilla (24.1% of difference) is greater than the effect generated by the 
first level of professional training (22.1% of increase in relation to the EGB) and almost as 
important as working in the energy industry instead of commerce (25.4% of improvement). 
The conclusion is, then, clear: after controlling for a wide group of variables related to 
individuals and job characteristics, the presence of an important territorial effect on wages is 
detected. It is true that the provincial dummy coefficients should express the effect of 
variables not present in the equation due, for example, to the insufficient level of segregation 
in the case of industries
12
. In spite of this, the magnitude of the statistically significant 
coefficients allows to state that the effect of the territory on wages is quantitatively significant. 
As is shown in Table 2, the rest of the factors being equal, wages in Barcelona are 24.2% 
higher than in Sevilla; in Guadalajara 22.7% higher, in Gerona 19.4% higher and in Alava 
17.9% higher. On the other hand, in Almería the wages are 17.6% lower than in Sevilla, in 
Zamora 16.5% lower, in Granada 13.5% and in Cáceres 12.7%. Map 2 presents another 
excellent overview of the subject. The 14 provinces that pay a higher wage form -with the 
exception of Huelva- a geographically continuous area from Madrid toward the east to 
Cataluña and the Baleares Islands and from Madrid towards the north to Navarra and the País 
Vasco. This area is not an homogeneous one and bears some characteristics that should be 
remarked upon. On the one hand, this area includes ten provinces with higher per capita 
incomes with respect to the Spanish average and among these ten are the first nine
13
. 
Moreover, nearly every province in the area presents a higher manufacturing specialisation 
index relative to the national total. It also contains three of the biggest cities in Spain: Madrid 
(1st), Barcelona (2nd) and Zaragoza (5th) and some of the provinces with the highest 
                                                     
12
 On the other hand, this problem does not seem to appear in occupations. Although in the results provided there 
are 19 different occupations, we have checked that considering 83 different occupations does not affect the 
provincial dummy coefficients more than marginally. 
13
 To be specific, in ascending order, Baleares Islands, Gerona, Madrid, Tarragona, Alava, Barcelona, Navarra, 
Guadalajara and Zaragoza. 
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population densities in Spain
14
. In the third place, this area is dominated by three 
manufacturing areas of great dynamism -Madrid, Barcelona and Zaragoza- which seem to 
have large areas of influence
15
. Finally, some of the Spanish provinces that pay higher wages 
are located in one of the two geographical axes of great dynamism over the last ten years and 
especially during the second half of the eighties
16
. First, the Mediterranean Arc, an economic 
region that -in Spanish territory- includes Cataluña, the Community of Valencia and the 
Baleares Islands contains four provinces with higher wages: Barcelona, Gerona, Tarragona 
and the Baleares Islands. Second, the so-called axis of the Ebro covers half the valley of the 
River Ebro and continues towards the north to Navarra
17
 with three of the provinces with 
positive wages effects- Zaragoza, Teruel and Navarra-. Alava and Guipuzcoa (in the País 
Vasco) are the natural continuation of the same area. These considerations seem to question 
the explanation of the differences based on territorial attractions, and at the same time propose 
two hypotheses already advanced by the economic theory and not necessarily exclusive. In the 
first place, the role of prices and their territorial differences as important explanative variables, 
as it is supposed that prices will be higher in these urban zones of greater dynamism and 
higher incomes; in the second place, the relevance of the demand for labour, since the 
provinces described will have more tight labour markets. 
 
MAP 2 
 
The models shown in Tables 3 and 4 allow these hypotheses to be contrasted. In the models 
numbered from 1 to 3 the territorial dummy variables have been substituted by a group of 
variables that attempt to approach the attraction of the different areas. The results are not very 
satisfactory, since only the variable coastal kilometres has the expected negative value and is 
                                                     
14
 Such as Madrid (619 inhab. per Km2), Barcelona (602 inhab. per Km2) and Guipuzcoa (339 inhab. per Km2). 
15
 Gerona and Tarragona in the proximities of Barcelona, Teruel and Navarra near Zaragoza and Guadalajara, 
Segovia and Soria to the north of Madrid. 
16
 It is worth remembering that the data used is for 1990-1991. 
17
 See, for example, Velarde/García Delgado/Pedreño (1992), especially Chapters 1, 7, 10 and 13. 
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statistically significant. The rest of the variables are not significant or have contrary signs to 
those expected by the theoretical approach of compensatory differences. Actually, educational 
services are related positively to wages. 
 
TABLE 3 
 
The inclusion of prices in Model 2 allows the global adjustment of the estimated equation to 
be partially improved and its coefficient has the expected positive value with an elevated value 
but below unit. We should conclude then that differences in wages partly balance the 
territorial inequalities of prices. When adding the unemployment rate -Model 3-, we obtain a 
coefficient with a negative value, indicating the short term prevalence of forces of the Curve 
of Phillips type opposed to those acting to the contrary. As models in table 3 are nested, F-
tests can be carried out to test if the improvement achieved when adding new variables is 
statistically significant. The values of these tests
18
 show that the more general model (model 3) 
cannot be rejected in favour of the restricted models 1 or 2. The evidence obtained does not 
allow it to be held that the territorial wage differences can be explained completely in terms of 
the theory of compensatory differences. 
 
Model 4 in Table 4 shows the results of an estimation where the compensatory difference 
variables have been taken away and only the unemployment rate is considered as 
representative of existent disequilibriums in the labour markets. The unemployment rate 
appears as highly significant with a coefficient of -0.08, close to that estimated by 
Blanchflower/Oswald (1994) for various developed countries (-0.10). The possibility that 
rigidities existing in the markets can be reflected in different levels of prices at a territorial 
level suggests the introduction of  prices -in logarithms- in Model 5. We obtain a negative 
effect for the unemployment rate and positive and very close to the unit value for the prices. 
As the wage elasticity to prices is almost unitary, a practically total equivalence should be 
                                                     
18
 The value of the test to select between models 3 and 1 is 341.04; between 3 and 2, 341.14 and between 1 and 
2, 334.17 with critical values at 0.05 significance level of 3.00, 3.84 and 3.84 respectively. 
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expected between this estimation and another taking the real wages as the dependent variable. 
Model 6 show the results of this last approach where only the intercept value is modified. 
 
TABLE 4 
 
In conclusion, the "territorial effects" on wages are quantitatively significant and the evidence 
obtained indicates that one could not interpret them as compensatory differences for the 
unequal attraction of the territories. In fact, from the point of view of compensatory 
differences the only variable that explains partially the "territorial effects" on wages is 
different prices. The inclusion of the unemployment rate allows checking for the existence of a 
negative effect on the provincial wages. Its magnitude (-0.069 in Models 5 and 6) approaches 
reasonably the estimates of Blanchflower/Oswald for countries with lower values of the 
coefficient. Otherwise, the fact that the model that best fits is the one that includes the dummy 
provincial variables seems to indicate that the considered explanative variables in Models 1 to 
6 have just not gathered together all the effects of the territory on wages. Therefore, although 
prices and unemployment explain, in an adequate way, most of the impact of the territory on 
wages, there probably remain some additional territorial wage effects that should be studied in 
the future. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The present work has tried to study the principal explanatory causes of wage differences 
among the Spanish provinces. The review of the theoretical literature has allowed the 
detection of two alternative hypotheses. The more genuinely neoclassical approach, underlines 
the existence of differences in the composition of the labour force as main explanatory factors- 
particularly in its human capital-, as well as in the composition of employment and in job 
characteristics. Once the influence of these factors is eliminated, territorial wages should 
coincide, at least in real terms, if differences in levels of prices exist. In the event of remaining 
wage differences, these should correspond to the unequal attraction of the territories. A second 
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line of reasoning -closest to approaches that highlight the importance of the institutional 
frame- postulates that, confronted with the limited geographical mobility of the labour force, 
the variables of demand will explain the observed wage differences, at least, real terms 
differences. The available empirical evidence for the United States points out the important 
explanatory role of prices, while the evidence obtained for the United Kingdom puts the 
explanatory capacity of the variables related to rigidities in the labour market, mainly the 
unemployment rate, in first place. 
 
The empirical work has used individual data from the Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares 
1990-91. We have used a sample of this survey containing information about those people 
who have declared that they receive incomes from paid employment (16,949 individuals). We 
have estimated enlarged Mincer equations containing variables related mainly to the 
occupation and sector and with diverse specifications of the territorial effect. The principal 
conclusions could be stated explicitly in the following form. 
 
First, the "territorial effect" is quantitatively important and of positive value in the case of 
fourteen provinces that -except Huelva- are located in a continuous geographical area running 
between Madrid and Cataluña-Baleaes Islands to the east, and between Madrid and Navarra-
País Vasco towards the north. This area is not homogeneous, but it is mainly placed under the 
influence of the two most dynamic axes of the Spanish economy -the Mediterranean Arc and 
the axis of the Ebro- and includes the nine richest provinces of Spain, as well as some of the 
most populated ones. 
 
Second, the wage differences could not be explained by the unequal attraction, neither climatic 
nor cultural, educational, in health, nor in entertainment of the provinces. Only the prices seem 
to influence wages in order to balance the differences in its level, trying to avoid the 
inequalities that otherwise would be generated in purchasing power. 
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Third, the unequal territorial distribution of unemployment causes, at least in the short term, 
an appreciable negative influence on wages. This fact reveals the existence of a Wage Curve, 
with a value of the coefficient reasonably close to the ones obtained by Blanchflower/Oswald 
(1994) for countries with lower values of the coefficient. This negative relationship seems to 
confirm that the mobility of the labour force is low finding serious resistance in acting quickly 
and efficiently and causing permanent disequilibriums in regional labour markets. This is a 
result that is common to the group of European countries, since similar estimations have found 
practically the same effect of the unemployment rate on wages. 
In future research, the continuation and improvement of the studies should consist in the 
quantification and explanation of the territorial effects on wages not explained in the present 
study, that is to say those neither explained by the price differential nor by unemployment. A 
reasonable hypothesis is that, with more segregated data, the detected differences at provincial 
levels would correspond only to differences between some towns and not the whole provinces. 
For this reason, the next step in this line of research should consist of studying the possible 
effect of territories on wages as a result of the presence of external economies. These external 
economies may be generated by the size of the labour market or by an accumulation of the 
same kind of qualified productive employment (Rauch, 1993), or generated by the 
concentration of diverse productive activities in the territory or by specialization in a dominant 
activity (Glaeser/Maré, 1994). This type of study, complementary to the one presented here, 
should necessarily be carried out at a local level, a level which requires more detailed 
statistical information that is more precise than that used in the elaboration of this paper. 
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Table 1 
OLS ESTIMATION 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of wages 
intercept 12.784   (381.760) ocu19 -0.071 (-2.350) pr22 0.007   (0.184) 
gender -0.378    (-33.066) Industrial dummies pr23 0.022   (0.528) 
Schooling years dummies se10 0.226     (6.248) pr24 -0.034  (-0.824) 
est01 -0.377    (-16.413) se20 0.185     (5.991) pr25 0.035   (0.755) 
est2 -0.143    (-10.208) se30 0.128     (5.511) pr26 0.038   (0.928) 
est4  0.291    (14.272) se40 0.038     (1.728) pr27 -0.041  (-0.871) 
est5  0.349    (14.870) se50 0.087     (3.306) pr28 0.122   (3.730) 
est6  0.200      (9.174) se70 0.134     (5.653) pr29 0.058   (1.494) 
est7  0.361    (16.199) se80 0.078     (3.136) pr30 -0.062  (-1.640) 
est8  0.641    (28.830) se90 0.041      (2.409) pr31 0.145    (-3.641) 
est9  0.765    (30.415) Provincial dummies pr32 -0.065  (-1.315) 
exp  0.057    (42.666) pr1 0.164   (4.015) pr33 -0.023  (-0.558) 
exp2 -0.001   (-28.457) pr2 0.026   (0.591) pr34 -0.094  (-2.124) 
part-time -0.467    (-14.687) pr3 -0.014  (-0.418) pr35 0.072   (1.759) 
Occupational dummies pr4 -0.194  (-4.130) pr 36 -0.037  (-0.965) 
ocu1  0.325    (14.496) pr5 0.049   (0.991) pr37 0.001   (0.028) 
ocu2 0.010     (0.229) pr6 -0.026  (-0.593) pr38 -0.009  (-0.239) 
ocu3 0.252     (2.315) pr7 0.112   (2.976) pr39 0.075   (1.739) 
ocu4 0.365     (9.320) pr8 0.216   (6.202) pr40 0.101   (2.144) 
ocu5 0.237     (13.003) pr9 0.021   (0.481) pr42 0.142   (3.075) 
ocu6 0.321     (6.581) pr10 -0.136  (-3.114) pr43 0.144   (3.523) 
ocu7 0.518     (6.094) pr11 -0.048  (-1.286) pr44 0.133   (2.863) 
ocu8 0.153     (7.082) pr12 0.046   (1.027) pr45  0.060  (1.284) 
ocu10 0.339     (7.427) pr13 -0.011  (-0.261) pr46 -0.044  (-1.294) 
ocu11 0.301     (4.543) pr14 -0.094  (-2.196) pr47 0.039   (0.912) 
ocu12 0.116     (2.399) pr15 0.010   (0.273) pr48 0.032   (0.897) 
ocu13 0.169     (2.558) pr16 0.043   (0.844) pr49 -0.180  (-3.583) 
ocu14 0.069     (2.686) pr17 0.177   (4.386) pr50 0.134   (3.386) 
ocu15 0.166     (7.430) pr18 -0.145  (-3.368) N 16,949 
ocu16 0.263     (5.716) pr19 0.204   (4.452) R2 0.4067 
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ocu17 0.033     (1.140) pr20 0.088   (2.315) Adj. R2 0.4036 
ocu18 0.135     (5.511) pr21 0.152   (2.982) F 132.849 
  For a description of the variables, see text and tables 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. 
  t-statistic values are between parenthesis. 
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Table 2 
 
Interprovincial wage differences from Sevilla 
Results obtained from the OLS estimations of the coefficients associated to the provincial dummies1 
PR8 24.17 %* PR28 12.99%* PR16 4.43% PR37 0.15% PR11 -4.68%  
PR19 22.69%* PR7 11.91%* PR47 4.06% PR38 -0.93% PR30 -6.03% 
PR17 19.37%* PR40 10.67%* PR26 3.91% PR13 -1.12% PR32 -6.29%  
PR1 17.84%* PR20 9.23 %* PR25 3.58% PR3 -1.47% PR14 -8.98%* 
PR21 16.53%* PR39 7.79% PR48 3.27% PR33 -2.30% PR34 -0.03%* 
PR31 15.65%* PR35 7.50% PR2 2.59% PR6 -2.59% PR10 -12.73%* 
PR43 15.51%* PR45 6.20% PR23 2.29% PR24 -3.35%  PR18 -13.51%* 
PR42 15.32%* PR29 6.02% PR9 2.13% PR36 -3.69% PR49 -16.52%* 
PR50 14.34%* PR5 5.10% PR15 1.02% PR27 -4.09%  PR4 -17.63%* 
PR44 14.29%* PR12 4.68% PR22 0.79% PR46 -4.31%   
 1. Calculated as: exp(coefficient)-1 
 * the associated dummy is significant at a 5% level 
 
 
Table 3 
 
OLS ESTIMATION 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of wages 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
intercept 12.559 (207.177) 9.459 (12.078) 9.576 (12.106) 
coast -8.515*10-5 (-2.298) -6.695*10-5 (-1.794) -4.39*10-5 (-1.156) 
temperature 0.001 (1.533) 0.001 (1.014) 0.001 (0.788) 
university degrees 0.002 (4.077) 0.002 (2.363) 0.001 (2.209) 
hospital beds 0.002 (4.825) 0.002 (4.041) 0.002 (4.242) 
libraries 0.007 (0.648) 0.019 (1.701) 0.013 (1.152) 
restaurants 0.005 (7.055) 0.004 (4.161) 0.003 (2.830) 
films -0.001 (-0.484) -0.001 (-0.538) -0.002 (-1.048) 
log of prices   0.690 (3.971) 0.649 (3.723) 
log of unemployment.     -0.046 (-3.144) 
N 16,949 16,949 16,949 
R2 0.3972 0.3977 0.3981 
Adjusted R2 0.3955 0.3961 0.3964 
F  247.457 242.632 237.804 
 Every model also includes the following exogenous variables: gender, schooling years dummies, experience and its square, 
part-time, occupational and industrial dummies. 
 For a description of the variables, see text. 
 t-statistic values are between parenthesis. 
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Table 4 
 
OLS ESTIMATION 
Dependent variables: natural logarithm of nominal (Models 4 and 5) and real wages (Model 6) 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
intercept 12.791 (294.220) 8.272 (14.088) 12.802 (294.982) 
log of prices   0.983 (7.717)   
log of unemployment -0.079 (-7.063) -0.069 (-6.116) -0.069 (-6.144) 
N 16,949 16,949 16,949 
R2 0.3946 0.3967 0.3944 
Adjusted R2 0.3932 0.3953 0.3930 
F 282.557 277.936 282.376 
 Every model also includes the following exogenous variables: gender, schooling years dummies, experience and its square, 
part-time, occupational and industrial dummies. 
 For a description of the variables, see text. 
 t-statistic values are between parenthesis. 
 
Table 5 
 
CODE SCHOOLING YEARS DESCRIPTION 
EST01 0 years Illiterate - without studies 
EST2 6 years Primary education 
EST3 9 years EGB or equivalent 
EST4 12 years BUP or equivalents 
EST5 13 years COU 
EST6 11 years Technical studies, first degree (FP-1) 
EST7 14 years Technical studies, second degree (FP-2) 
EST8 16 years Medium university titulation or equivalent 
EST9 18 years High university titulation or quivalent 
 
Table 6 
 
OCCUPATIONS DESCRIPTION 
OC1 Law and science professionals and technicians,teachers 
OC2 Artistic and sports professionals and technicians 
OC3 Public sector managers and officers 
OC4 Office, transport and communications services managers 
OC5 Administrative services workers 
OC6 Managers of companies, commercial establishments and in hotels and catering 
OC7 Sales executives 
OC8 Traders  
OC9 Non-sale services workers 
OC10 Shop managers, foremen and persons in charge 
OC11 Extraction of minerals industry workers 
OC12 Elaboration of minerals industry workers 
OC13 Chemical industry workers 
OC14 Food, wood, clothes, shoes, furnitures, etc. industry workers 
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OC15 Electricists and electronic technicians 
OC16 Graphic arts, paper and plastic industry workers 
OC17 Construction workers 
OC18 Drivers 
OC19 Labourers 
 
Table 7 
 
INDUSTRIES DESCRIPTION 
se10 Energy and water 
se20 Extraction and non-energetic minerals rransformation, chemistry industry 
se30 Metalic elaboration industrys, precision mechanics 
se40 Other manufacturing industries 
se50 Construction 
se60 Commerce, restaurants and hotels, repairs 
se70 Transport and communications 
se80 Financial institutions, insurances, services to firms and rents 
se90 Other services 
 
 
Table 8 
 
CODE PROVINCE CODE PROVINCE CODE PROVINCE CODE PROVINCE 
PR1 Alava PR14 Córdoba PR27 Lugo PR40 Segovia 
PR2 Albacete PR15 Coruña (La) PR28 Madrid PR41 Sevilla 
PR3 Alicante PR16 Cuenca PR29 Málaga PR42 Soria 
PR4 Almería PR17 Gerona PR30 Murcia PR43 Tarragona 
PR5 Avila PR18 Granada PR31 Navarra PR44 Teruel 
PR6 Badajoz PR19 Guadalajara PR32 Orense PR45 Toledo 
PR7 Baleares Islands PR20 Guipúzcoa PR33 Asturias PR46 Valencia 
PR8 Barcelona PR21 Huelva PR34 Palencia PR47 Valladolid 
PR9 Burgos PR22 Huesca PR35 Palmas (Las) PR48 Vizcaya 
PR10 Cáceres PR23 Jaén PR36 Pontevedra PR49 Zamora 
PR11 Cádiz PR24 León PR37 Salamanca PR50 Zaragoza 
PR12 Castellón de la Plana PR25 Lleida PR38 Sta. Cruz Tenerife  
PR13 Ciudad Real PR26 Rioja (La) PR39 Cantabria  
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